Issues directly or indirectly related to the increasing costs of health care services have the potential to adversely affect physicians' fiduciary responsibilities to their patients. Coding deception in response to perceived unfairness in reimbursement practices represents one of these potential adverse influences. This case discussion addresses the potential motivations underlying coding deception and the reasons it cannot be supported from either a legal or ethical perspective.
This case raises the following ethical questions: (1) What are the potential harms that may result from coding deception? (2) Ultimately, when confronted with the conflicting influences of multiple stakeholders, what are the legal and ethical considerations that should determine the neurologist's most appropriate response?
DISCUSSION
The foundation of the practice of medicine has been physician integrity, commitment to professionalism, and fiduciary responsibility to individual patients. Historically, the burden of this responsibility has been balanced by considerable physician autonomy to act in the patient's best interest. In the current health care environment, however, numerous forces have disrupted this equilibrium.
3Y6 Although physicians maintain their fiduciary responsibility, their authority has been eroded by numerous stakeholders involved in health care expenditures. 3, 4 The percentage of US physicians employed by hospitals has risen to more than 50%. 7 Hospitals share the financial risks of patient care decisions and audit patient records to maximize reimbursement. Third-party payers have used numerous strategies to reduce cost, which many physicians find time-consuming and obstructive. 3, 8 The major impetus for these changes is the goal of controlling health care costs. In the last decade, health care expenditures in the United States have more than doubled to 17% of the gross domestic product. 9 Numerous mechanisms have been developed in an attempt to control these costs. The DRG system of prospective payments by Medicare for hospital reimbursement was established in 1982. 10 For each DRG, this program provides a fixed payment to hospitals for each patient admitted regardless of the actual costs of providing the care. The DRG payment amount is influenced by a number of factors, including primary and secondary diagnostic codes. Although a physician's choice of diagnosis largely influences institutional reimbursement, choice of code may also benefit the physician's reimbursement. In addition, acquiescence to the institutional request for coding may have other less tangible benefits to the physician. Unwanted confrontation may be avoided, and the physician may be viewed as a ''team player.'' In summary, coding decisions carry primary and secondary consequences that may affect physician reimbursement, the health care system as a whole, and, most importantly, the patient.
Studies have shown that as many as 87% of physicians are willing to deceive within the context of the payment system, although the number varies with study design, the population surveyed, the amount of work involved in appealing a decision, the magnitude of the deception, the penetrance of managed care in the region studied, the identity of the patient's payer, and the severity of the patient's medical problem. 3,5,11Y13 Although physicians could use coding deception to benefit themselves, existing data suggest that the primary motive for physician deception is patient benefit. 11, 13 A survey of resident physicians who were willing to practice deception showed that only 4% about his standing in the hospital if he received a poor patient satisfaction survey score. The neurologist sought guidance regarding the legal and ethical issues in the use of deception in diagnosis coding.
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Conflicts of Interest in Coding endorsed self-serving motives, as opposed to 47% who did so with the intent of helping their patient.
14 Thus, the primary motivation for ''gaming the system'' is patient benefit. 11, 14 Physician perception that the reimbursement system is unfair may be another motivator. 3 The practice of third-party payers denying payment for certain codes or levels of service, particularly primary or secondary psychiatric diagnostic codes when patients are seen by nonpsychiatrists, is troubling to many physicians. 15, 16 It is no wonder, then, that in response to these perceived inequities physicians or administrators could rationalize that coding deception is justified because it is altruistic, fiduciary, and logical; however, such rationalization is wrong.
CONCLUSIONS
In the case of deceptive miscoding, ethical and legal guidance would find fault. Deceptive coding is a fraudulent and immoral action for which no ethical justification can be provided and is punishable by law.
1,2 The US Department of Justice considers health care fraud its second most important area of attention.
Arguably the most relevant ethical principle that applies to this case is nonmaleficence. Patients can be harmed by deceptive coding. An unfortunate example is the case of a patient who committed suicide after noting a diagnosis of ''brain tumor'' on an insurance document. The physician had used an inaccurate diagnosis in an attempt to circumvent her insurance company's unwillingness to pay for a screening procedure. 6 Application of an incorrect code with inappropriate connotations, as in the case described in this article, may bias health care professionals responsible for the patient's future care. 17 This stigma also has the potential to bias potential employers and insurers, resulting in possible discriminative practices. Coding deception also has the potential to harm patient populations. Epidemiologic data are often based on diagnostic codes assigned by hospitals and physician offices.
One definition of integrity is the knowledge of what is right and wrong and the willingness to do what is right even in the face of personal cost. 18 When confronted with a conflict between the patient's interests and the interests of a hospital or practice, a physician should attempt to resolve any impediments to the patient's care, even if doing so is time-consuming. In this case, the neurologist should follow guidance provided by the AAN and other professional organizations, 19, 20 which is to provide truthful diagnostic codes and to advocate for their patients. The sixth edition of the American College of Physicians Ethics Manual, published in early 2012, provides an extensive discussion of the ethics of practice and conflicts that can arise between the patient's interests and those of third parties, stating, ''Whether financial incentives in the fee-for-service system prompt physicians to do more rather than less or capitation arrangements encourage them to do less rather than more, physicians must not allow such considerations to affect their clinical judgment or patient counseling on treatment options, including referrals.'' 20 The neurologist in the case presented above should not follow the coding advisor's recommendation to use an inaccurate diagnostic code.
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